U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities An Assessment of Tools, Methods, and Approaches for the 21st Century Security Environment (2014) / Chapter Skim
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4 The Recommended Way Forward
4 The Recommended Way Forward
Pages 88-100
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From page 88... ...
As current nuclear nonpeers emerge as near-peers or peers, they may not act as we expect. The nonpeer states that currently possess nuclear weapons and who are developing them are often ruled by regimes difficult to penetrate and about which decision-making dynamics are difficult to divine.
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From page 89... ...
It is within this context that the Air Force fulfills it deterrence and assurance mission. The subject of this study was analytic methods used to support Air Force decisions as it organizes, equips, and trains to meet its responsibilities in deterring adversaries and assuring allies.
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From page 90... ...
This community has taken preliminary steps to address deep uncertainty. A significant impediment to improved analysis in the deterrence and assurance domain is the limited number of analysts assigned to the deterrence and assurance mission and the organizational barriers that separate military and nonmilitary analytical agen cies addressing deterrence and assurance in a whole-of-government context.1 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS In broad terms a responsive analysis will include the tasks illustrated in Figure 4-1.
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From page 91... ...
Figure 4-1 Sensitivity to the roles of other services, other government agencies, and possible actions by allies should also be analyzed. Keeping in mind the presence of deep uncertainty, assessments must consider the risk of being unable to deliver a par ticular capability at the time it is needed or the risk that the capability does not produce the desired effect.
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From page 92... ...
Recommendation 1. In support of senior Air Force leadership guidance, including the Flight Plan for the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise, the Air Force should develop and maintain a comprehensive strategic deterrence analysis plan to identify the tasks that produce information required to organize, equip, and train Air Force nuclear deterrence and assurance forces and support combatant commanders (Air Force, 2013)
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From page 93... ...
Implementation. With respect to implementation, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration should be assigned responsibility, with contributions from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Require ments; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs; and the Director for Studies and Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned, as well as the Air Force Global Strike Command and the Air Force Materiel Command, for developing and recommending to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force an outline of the DAAP.
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From page 94... ...
The methods of content analysis and leader ship profiling in conjunction with other methods have the potential to help meet requirements of actor-specific knowledge for a strategy of tailored deterrence. An alliance among content analysis, leadership profiling, abstract modeling, and gam ing and simulations as a suite of methods is possible in order to solve the complex problems associated with studying the decision-making dynamics of single groups and multiple autonomous actors as decision units.
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From page 95... ...
Strategic Command. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration should be the focal point for the Air Force and should prepare an Air Force advocacy briefing for approval by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
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From page 96... ...
The methods of content analysis and leader ship profiling, in conjunction with other methods, have the potential to help meet requirements of actor-specific knowledge for a strategy of tailored deterrence. An alliance among content analysis, leadership profiling, abstract modeling, and gam ing and simulations as a suite of methods is possible in order to solve the complex problems associated with studying the decision-making dynamics of single groups and multiple autonomous actors as decision units.
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From page 97... ...
With respect to implementation, Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration should coordinate with the Director for Studies and Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned to describe the unique attributes of deterrence and assurance analysis and the value of integrated hybrid approaches. Based on that description, the Director for Studies and Analyses, As sessments and Lessons Learned and the Air Force Education and Training Com mand should recommend a program to ensure that analysts have the knowledge and expertise required to bring appropriate hybrid approaches to bear on the analyses of deterrence and assurance issues.
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From page 98... ...
Such knowledge can be acquired through academic courses and experiential learning tailored to the 21st century security environment, yet deterrence and assurance analysis is currently underresourced. If the Air Force is to develop analytically based strategies and perspectives that are credible in the joint arena, and if Air Force leaders are to be prepared with reliable, informed reviews of alternative options considered in that arena, then the relevant analytic community must be adequately resourced.
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From page 99... ...
Increasing the Air Force analytic capacity to understand and utilize human and human organization factors will inform the region by region contributions the Air Force must make to tailored deterrence, facilitate earlier recognition of potential failure, expand understanding of the risk-taking behavior of adversaries and allies as well as al lowing more specific tailoring of the Air Force response to potential deterrence or assurance needs. Advocacy of research to develop a generalized understanding of leadership, decision making, and behavior dynamics related to deterrence and assurance will improve the robustness of longer-term planning, provide a region by region baseline deterrence environment and assist in responding to leadership changes in adversaries or allies.
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